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COMPLETE LIST OF ALL PARTIES IN DISTRICT COURT
The parties in the district court were Cuma S. Hoopiiaina, Steven Williams, Kyle
Williams and J. Richard Williams. Appellant Lucille T. Williams is a non-party seeking
inter ' ei ition.
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Appellant Lucille T. Williams individually and as trustee for the Lucille T.
Williams Trust ("Williams"), is a non-party who sought intervention in the trial court
action pending before the Honorable Judge Sandra N. Peuler, Third Judicial District
Court, Salt Lake County, State of Utah.
Williams responds to the Brief of Appellees as follows:
I.

Williams' Motion to Intervene and Memorandum in Support Thereof Was
Filed Timely.
Williams filed her Motion to Intervene and Memorandum in Support thereof on

October 30, 2002, after she became aware that the Order of trial Judge Sandra Peuler
would affect her property rights as owner of the property at issue. Williams had not been
made a party to the trial court action prior to that date (R. 479-486). During the time that
the action was pending before the trial court Williams had an understanding that her
husband was in a dispute with Appellee Cuma Hoopiiaina, however, she had no
understanding of the details or substance of the proceedings and no understanding that the
outcome may affect her rights as property owner. (R. 479-486). Williams' Motion to
Intervene and Memorandum in Support thereof were filed prior to the signing of Findings
of Fact by Judge Peuler on November 26, 2002 (R. 584-586, 588-613) and while the
issues before this court regarding whether the proper parties were before the trial court
were still being disputed.

1

II.

Williams Had a Right to Intervene Pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 78-34-7 and
Rule 24(a), Utah Rules of Civil Procedure.
Rule 24(a), Utah Rules of Civil Procedure provides for a right of intervention upon

"timely application." See, Rule 24(a), Utah Rules of Civil Procedure when a statute
confers an unconditional right to intervene.
Utah Code Annotated, Section 78-34-7 provides, in pertinent part:
All persons in occupation of, or having or claiming an interest in,
any of the property described in the Complaint, or in the damage for
the taking thereof, though not named, may appear, plead and defend,
each in respect to his own property or interest, or that claimed by
him, in the same manner as if named in the Complaint. § 78-34-7,
UCA(1953).
Pursuant to Rule 24(a), Utah Rules of Civil Procedure and Utah Code annotated
78-34-7, when an intervening party may establish a valid interest in property which is or
will be affected by the determination in a pending case, the movant should be allowed to
intervene. See, generally. State v. Tedesco, 4 Utah 31, 286 P.2d 785 (1955).
Williams had an undisputed interest in the property in question as evidenced by the
Deed conveying the property to her as Trustee for the Lucille T. Williams Trust. (R. 597613; 479-486). The action before the trial court had the potential to and the affect of
impairing Lucille Williams' ability to protect her interest in the property. In Lima v.
Chambers, 657 P.2d 279 (Utah 1982), the Utah Supreme Court held that the trial court
should consider whether the intervening movant "is or may be bound by a judgment in the
litigation" then liberally construe the application of Rule 24(a) in an effort to eliminate
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unnecessary duplication of litigation. Id. at 282. The Utah Supreme Court has defined
the nature of the interest necessary to permit intervention as follows: "[t]o justify
intervention [as of right], the party seeking [it] must demonstrate a direct interest in the
subject matter of the litigation such that the intervenor's rights may be affected, for good
or for ill" Lima. 657 P.2d at 282.
Appellee argues that Williams' Motion to Intervene was untimely because the
action had been pending since December 5, 1995; however, Williams has established that
she had not been made a party to the trial court action (R. 479-486). Further, during the
time that the action was pending before the trial court Williams had an understanding that
her husband was in a dispute with Appellee Cuma Hoopiiaina; however, she had no
understanding of the details or substance of the proceedings and no understanding that the
outcome may affect her rights as property owner. These issues were being handled
exclusively by her husband and his attorney. (R. 479-486).
In addition, Williams' Motion to Intervene and Memorandum in Support of
Motion to Intervene were filed prior to the signing of Findings of Fact by Judge Peuler on
November 26, 2002 (R. 584-586, 588-613) and while the issues before this court were
still being disputed.
Appellees cite the case of Republic Ins. Group v. Doman, 774 P.2d 1130, 1131
(Utah 1989) in which the court analyzed whether a timely application to intervene had
been filed. In Republic Ins., the Utah Supreme Court cited Jenner v. Real Estate Services,

659 P.2d 1072 (Utah 1983) in which the court stated that in determining if a timely
application to intervene has been made, the court should consider the facts and
circumstances of each particular case. Id. at 1073-4. In the Republic Ins. case, the Court
denied the intervenor's request, finding that he had waited too long to attempt to
intervene. The Republic Ins. case is clearly distinguishable as the party seeking to
intervene in that action knew the action was pending prior to his attempt to intervene. Id.
at 1131. Further, the party seeking to intervene stated that he believed his interests had
been represented in the trial court action. Id. at 1131-2. The intervenor in the Republic
Ins. case had also filed his Motion to Intervene after the pertinent facts contained in a
pending motion for summary judgment had been deemed admitted. Id. at 1131-2.
In the case before this court, it is undisputed that Williams knew there was
litigation between her husband and Appellee but did not know that the outcome may
affect her property rights. (R. 479-486). It is also undisputed that her rights and interests
were not being represented by any attorneys or parties to the case before the trial court.
(R. 479-486). Appellees have presented no evidence to controvert Williams' assertions
on these two issues. The only assertion of Appellees is that a Warranty Deed was
executed conveying the property to Williams as Trustee of the Lucille T. Williams Trust
during the pendency of the litigation before the trial court, on July 12, 2001. (R. 479486). At no time was Williams individually, or as trustee, made a party to the trial court
proceedings and at no time were her interests represented. Finally, unlike the factual
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scenario in Republic Ins., there were issues and pleadings filed by all parties in the trial
court action regarding the interests of Williams in the property and asserting that the
proper parties were not before the court immediately prior to and at the time her Motion
to Intervene was filed. In this case, the trial court did not issue Findings of Fact and
Conclusions of Law until November 26, 2002, after additional briefing regarding whether
the proper parties were before the court had been filed by all parties. (R. 397-459; 499510). In Republic Ins., the facts which were the subject of the disputed summary
judgment ruling were not an issue.
Lucille Williams' position is directly addressed by the language of § 78-34-7 and
she should have been allowed to intervene on that basis.
III.

Williams Should Have Been Allowed to Intervene Permissively Under Rule
24(b), Utah Rules of Civil Procedure.
Appellee does not counter Williams' argument that she should have been allowed

to intervene permissively under Rule 24(b), Utah Rules of Civil Procedure.
Rule 24(b)(2) provides, in pertinent part:
Permissive intervention. Upon timely application anyone may be
permitted to intervene in an action: (1) when a statute confers a
conditional right to intervene; or (2) when an applicant's claim or
defense and the main action have a question of law or fact in
common . . . .
Lucille Williams' right to intervene under Utah Code Ann. § 78-34-7 is set forth
above. With the issues involved in this litigation, the request for relief and this Court's
ruling ordering the tearing down of the building on the Property, this action and any
5

subsequent action filed by Williams share common claims and defenses and have
virtually identical questions of fact and law. Further, because of the irreversible damage
which will be done in light of the relief ordered, i.e., tear down of the building located on
the Property, it was fundamentally unfair to not permit Williams to intervene. If the
Court's order (not yet complied with) is complied with and Williams is not allowed to
intervene, irreparable damage will have been done with regard to the building. On this
basis alone, her intervention should have been permitted.
IV.

Rule 25(c) Allows, and Does Not Prohibit Intervention of Williams in the
Trial Court Proceeding by Filing of a Motion to Intervene.
Appellees argue that the action against the property could have continued after

transfer to Williams under Rule 25(c), Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, which provides that
the court may substitute the transferor or join the transferor in existing litigation involving
transferred property upon motion and that such substitution is at the discretion of the trial
court. Williams as a transferee of property sought such transfer or joinder through the
Motion to Intervention and Memorandum in Support of Motion to Intervene which she
filed with the trial court. The provisions of Rule 25(c) do not prohibit or limit a party's
ability to request to intervene via motion for intervention. Rule 25(c) does not specify
what type of motion must be filed but merely states that parties may be added or
substituted "upon motion" if allowed by the trial court. Had the trial court granted
Williams' Motion to Intervene, she would have been substituted or added by the court
"upon motion" as allowed by Rule 25(c), Utah Rules of Civil Procedure.
6

V.

Williams Complied with Rule 24(c) by Filing a "Pleading".
Appellees argue that Williams failed to file a motion with a pleading setting forth

the grounds for the motion and claim or defense for which intervention is sought as
required by Rule 24(c), Utah Rules of Civil Procedure. This assertion is false. Williams
filed with the trial court, on October 30, 2002, two pleadings, a Motion to Intervene and a
Memorandum in Support of Motion to Intervene. (R. 584-586, 588-613). Further, such
pleadings were "served" on the parties to the trial court action by mailing a copy to their
attorneys as provided in Rule 5(b)(1) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure.
VI.

Williams Intervention Is Not Barred by Collateral Estoppel or Issue
Preclusion.
Appellees argue that Williams' claims are barred by collateral estoppel or issue

preclusion. Although M[i]t is well settled that issue preclusion prevents relitigation of the
same issue even if the claims for relief in the two actions are different." Sevy v. Security
Title Co. of S.Utah. 902 P.2d 629, 633 (Utah 1995), this doctrine is inappplicableto a
party with a statutory right to intervene. In the case at bar, Appellant's statutory rights to
intervene may not be abridged.
The only case cited by Appellees in support of their position is Macris &
Associates, Inc. v. Newavs. Inc.. 16 P.3d 1214 (Utah 2000). Macris is distinguishable
from the case before this Court. In Macris a marketing company brought an action
against a successor company for fraudulent transfer, successor liability and alter ego. The
intervenor in that case sought to assert additional claims for contract damages which were
7

not litigated before the trial court. The Utah Supreme Court discussed both claim
preclusion and issue preclusion, stating:
In order for claim preclusion to bar a subsequent cause of action a
plaintiff must satisfy three requirements: First, both cases must involve the
same parties or their privies. Second, the claim that is alleged to be barred
must have been presented in the first suit or must be one that could and
should have been raised in the first action. Third, the first suit must have
resulted in a judgment on the merits. Macris at 1219, citing Madsen v.
Borthick, 769 P.2d 245, 247 (Utah 1988).
Under the elements of claim preclusion set forth in the Macris case, the doctrine
cannot apply to this case. The first element cannot be met. Williams was not a party to
the first action and, as set forth above, she has presented uncontroverted evidence that the
parties to the litigation before the trial court were not her privies. Second, Appellees
cannot establish that Williams' claims or defenses were the same as those asserted by
others before the trial court because such claims and defenses have not been developed
due to her inability to participate in the trial court action.
In Macris, the court stated that a four part test is applied for purposes of issue
preclusion:
First, the issue challenged must be identical in the previous action and the
case at hand. Second, the issue must have been decided in a final judgment
on the merits in the previous action. Third, the issues must have been
competently, fully and fairly litigated in the previous action. Fourth, the
party against whom collateral estoppel is invoked in the current action must
have been either a party or privy to a party in the previous action. Macris at
1222 citing Jones, Waldo, Holbrook & McDonough v. Dawson, 934 P.2d
1366, 1370 (Utah 1996).
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Appellees cannot meet the elements necessary for issue preclusion. Again, as
discussed in the context of claims preclusion, the party against whom the doctrine is being
invoked was not a party to or privy to a party in the previous action. Further, the issues
were not fully and fairly litigated because Williams was not allowed to present any
evidence and was not represented by an attorney in the action before the trial court. The
very briefs filed by the parties after trial in this matter address the fact that the issues were
not fully and fairly litigated before the trial court because the property owner was not a
party to the litigation. (R. 304-366; 397-459). Further, no party has disputed that
Williams was not at all involved in the litigation before the trial court and no party has
established that her interests were addressed and protected as they would have been had
she been a party.
As set forth above, Williams had a right to intervene in the trial court action. She
was not allowed to intervene and was never a party. There is no assertion that her
interests were, in fact, represented or defenses asserted on her behalf by any parties to the
litigation. Her interests were not protected. The case before the trial court was not fully,
fairly and competently litigated with the primary missing party being the owner of the
property which is the subject of the action. The elements of issue preclusion and claims
preclusion have not been met.
Finally, Appellees state that they "only claim damages against J. Richard Williams
who readily admitted that he was the occupant of the servient property for over 25 years

9

and he alone obstructed the use of the easement by the plaintiffs." The fact is, however,
that the Amended Judgment and Decree issued by Judge Peuler affects the use and
enjoyment of the property by requiring removal of a building on the property and
"permanently enjoining" the property owner, not even a party to the litigation, "from
obstructing or interfering with Plaintiffs' use of the right of way." (R. 658-661). The
Amended Judgment and Decree of the trial court is not a matter of money damages being
sought against one of the existing defendants. The court's order directly impacts the use
and enjoyment of the property and the rights of Williams.
CONCLUSION
For the reasons set forth above, Appellant Williams requests that this Court
remand this matter to the trial court.
DATED t h i s ^ p ^ a y of August, 2004.
SNOW, CHRISTENSEN & MARTINEAU

iael R/Carlstof
Dunyon
Attorneys for Appellant Lucille Williams.
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